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What is Really Fair: Internet Sales and the Georgia
Long-Arm Statute
Ryan T. Holte*
INTRODUCTION
With over 86 million active members, quarterly revenues
over $1.2 billion, and 113 million concurrent listings,1 it is
little wonder that eBay2 transactions generate litigation.
Moreover, it is such an easy and popular tool for an ordinary
consumer to buy or sell goods that the legal implications of
using the site are often overlooked. Few eBay users recognize
that the simple sale of their old golf clubs, baseball cards, or
used car could result in a mandatory court appearance on the
opposite side of the country, answering to a buyer who wants
more than positive feedback.
The laws which subject these sellers to foreign
jurisdictions differ from state to state and are known as “longarm statutes.”3 With the popularity of e-commerce sites
growing4 and the jurisdiction of state long-arm statues
increasing, this issue is rapidly becoming more important.
States may be divided into “do or do-not-sell” classes such that
© 2009 Ryan T. Holte.
*Ryan T. Holte is a term law clerk (2008-2009) to Judge Loren A. Smith of
the United States Court of Federal Claims. He received his JD from the
University of California Davis School of Law, and a BS, magna cum laude,
in engineering from the California Maritime Academy. After his clerkship
with Judge Smith, he will clerk for Judge Stanley F. Birch of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit during the 2009-2010
term before returning to the law firm of Jones Day in Atlanta, GA. The
views set forth herein are the personal views of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the law firm, judge, or courts with which he is
associated. Please direct any comments to Ryan.Holte@Gmail.com
1. EBAY MARKETPLACES FACT SHEET 1 (2008), available at
http://news.ebay.com/fastfacts.cfm (follow “eBay Marketplaces Fast
Facts” hyperlink).
2. EBay Home Page, http://www.ebay.com.
3. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 961 (8th ed. 2004).
4. See EBAY MARKETPLACES FACT SHEET, supra note 1 (showing
continuous growth in the number of active users and listings).
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eBay members and other online sellers may target buyers that
have a lower risk of subjecting the seller to legal liability. A
national seller treating buyers differently based on the state
they reside in is not a new concept,5 and with the increase in
online sales and the litigation associated with those sales,
discrimination toward buyers based on state long-arm statutes
is likely to follow.
A recent example of an eBay seller being sued in a foreign
jurisdiction based on a sale made on the eBay auction site is
the 2006 Georgia Court of Appeals case Aero Toy Store, L.L.C.
v. Grieves.6 In Aero a Florida company sold a 2001 BMW car
to a Georgia resident for nearly $32,000.7 After receiving the
vehicle, the buyer filed suit in Georgia against the company,
Aero Toy Store, for making numerous misrepresentations
about the car.8 When Aero moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the trial court found, and the court of
appeals affirmed, that Aero had sufficient minimum contacts
with Georgia to authorize Georgia’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the company under its long-arm statute.9
This article analyzes the current issue of online merchants
being forced to defend themselves in foreign jurisdictions
during litigation concerning online sales. Part I describes the
history of personal jurisdiction from its nineteenth century
concerns with territoriality to the twentieth century minimum
contacts standard to other, more recent developments. Part II
summarizes personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts as
applied to the Internet generally and discusses whether
Internet sales contain sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy
the constitutional prerequisites for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the seller. Part III analyzes the Georgia longarm statute as it relates to jurisdiction over persons
transacting sales over the Internet. Finally, Part IV examines
the policies for and against allowing the Georgia long-arm
5. For example, national sellers may avoid selling certain animal
products, all terrain vehicles, and weapons to residents of certain states
based on the states’ respective endangered species laws, off-road vehicle
regulations, and criminal weapon codes.
6. Aero Toy Store, L.L.C. v. Grieves, 631 S.E.2d 734 (Ga. Ct. App.
2006).
7. Id. at 735.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 735–36, 741.
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statute to pull foreign sellers into Georgia before
recommending clear guidelines to the Georgia Legislature if it
were to amend the long-arm statute.

I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Before analyzing how the Georgia long-arm statute relates
to Internet transactions, we must first understand what
personal jurisdiction is, and how the current long-arm statute
has been interpreted generally by the Georgia Supreme Court.

A. TERRITORIALITY AND PENNOYER
Personal jurisdiction is defined as a “court’s power to bring
a person into its adjudicative process; jurisdiction over a
defendant’s personal rights, rather than merely over property
interests.”10 The Supreme Court introduced the concept of
In
personal jurisdiction in 1877 in Pennoyer v. Neff.11
Pennoyer both parties claimed title to a piece of land in
Oregon.12 Pennoyer asserted title under a deed resulting from
a sheriff’s sale of property to collect on a judgment entered in
Oregon against Neff, a non-resident of Oregon who claimed
that he was not properly served with process for the
proceeding that resulted in the judgment.13 The Supreme
Court determined that Pennoyer’s assertion of title was invalid
because the sheriff’s sale was unauthorized.14 The Court held
that Neff had not been properly served in the underlying case—
resulting in the personal judgment against him—because he
had not been personally served with process in Oregon15 (but
instead had only received constructive service by
publication16). The Court reasoned that to assure “proper
protection to citizens of other states,” due process required
that a court obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004).
11. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); see McGee v. Int’l Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (“Since Pennoyer v. Neff, this Court has
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places
some limit on the power of state courts to enter binding judgments
against persons not served with process within their boundaries.” (citation
omitted)).
12. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719.
13. Id. at 719–20.
14. Id. at 734.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 720.
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only by personal service of process within the forum state.17
In addition to setting the foundation for personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence, Pennoyer “served another key
function as it placed in personam jurisdictional analysis
squarely under the aegis of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause and provided support for the Court’s
subsequent declaration that jurisdiction based on ‘physical
presence’ ipso facto satisfies due process.”18 From 1877
forward, courts equated their jurisdictional reach with a
constitutional Fourteenth Amendment analysis based on the
physical presence of a person in the forum.19
As innovations in transportation and interstate commerce
increased at the turn of the twentieth century, courts
developed exceptions to allow “jurisdictional assertions based
on the type of dispute rather than a general adjudicative power
over the individual defendant.”20 One example was the
Supreme Court’s 1927 decision in Hess v. Pawloski.21 In Hess
the Court upheld a state statute which declared that driving on
a state highway is the equivalent of appointing an official of
that state as one’s process agent and thus confers personal
jurisdiction over the driver.22 By 1945 there were so many
exceptions to the physical presence requirement due to
technological advancements and increased commerce that the
Court decided to embrace a new jurisdictional theory.

B. INTERNATIONAL SHOE AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
As the usefulness of the physical presence standard
decreased, the 1945 International Shoe Court formulated a
more expansive test for the propriety of the extraterritorial

17. See id. at 726.
18. Jeffrey J. Utermohle, Maryland’s Diminished Long-Arm Jurisdiction
in the Wake of Zavian v. Foudy, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001) (citing
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733; Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619
(1990)).
19. Id.
20. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal
Jurisdiction Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too
Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach to Minimum Contacts, 57
BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 144 (2005).
21. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
22. Id. at 356–57. Jurisdiction was only appropriate for events
relating to driving on a highway, however. Id. at 354–56.
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exercise of personal jurisdiction.23 The new due process
standard to subject a defendant to a personal judgment when
he is not physically present, was that the defendant must have
“certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’”24 Thus a defendant may be
subject to a personal judgment in a foreign state based on
some activity other than that involving his physical presence.25
Courts analyzing the minimum contacts standard use a
two-step approach. First, they determine if minimum contacts
exist between the defendant and the forum, and second, they
analyze considerations of “fair play and substantial justice.”26
Thus, International Shoe embraced a new jurisdictional theory
founded upon the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction
instead of territoriality.27
In light of the expanded constitutional understanding of
personal jurisdiction announced in International Shoe, all fifty
states and the District of Columbia enacted long-arm statutes
to enable their courts to hale a nonresident into the forum to
defend against a lawsuit.28 Some states chose to extend their
courts’ jurisdictional reach to the full extent authorized by the
Supreme Court, while others tailored their statutes to the
specific requirements of their citizenry.29

23. Utermohle, supra note 18, at 6.
24. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
25. Susan Nauss Exon, A New Shoe is Needed to Walk Through
Cyberspace Jurisdiction, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 5 (2000).
26. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, and noting that courts seek to
afford defendants protection from unreasonable and unfair litigation).
27. Rhodes, supra note 20, at 147.
28. Utermohle, supra note 18, at 6 (citing 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 108.60[1] (3rd ed. 2003)).
29. Id., at 6–7.
Not all long-arm statutes are created equal: the overwhelming
majority of states...extend personal jurisdiction to the full extent
permitted by the due process decisions of the Supreme Court. On
the other hand, a small minority of states implement their longarm authority more narrowly than due process allows. For
instance, New York clings to an anachronistic approach best
described as ‘half-way between Pennoyer and International Shoe.
Id.
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C. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN GEORGIA
The Georgia long-arm statute is the general source of
statutory authority for the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents.30 The statute reads in part:
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
nonresident or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of
action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or
possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner
as if he were a resident of the state, if in person or through an
agent, he:
(1) Transacts any business within this state;
(2) Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except as
to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the
act;
(3) Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act
omission outside this state if the tort-feasor regularly does
solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
consumed or services rendered in this state;

or
or
of
or

(4) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within
this state . . . .31

The portion of the statute pertinent to the e-commerce
question at hand is subsection (1): “Transacts any business
within this state.”32
Before 2005, Georgia courts interpreted the “[t]ransacts
any business” language of the long-arm statute to apply only
to contract actions.33 An early Georgia Supreme Court case,
O.N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp., illustrates this contract
requirement while placing an emphasis on required contacts
and narrowing the scope of the statute within available due
process limits.34 The Jonas case concerned a contract,
executed outside of Georgia, between a nonresident defendant
30. Steven W. Hardy, Personal Jurisdiction in Georgia Over Claims
Arising from Business Conducted Over the Internet, GA. B.J., June 2006, at
21.
31. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (2007). Subsection (5) solely concerns
issues related to divorce and has been omitted. Id. § 9-10-91(5).
32. Id. § 9-10-91(1).
33. Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Shiv K. Kapoor, Extraterritorial Personal
Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century: A Case Study Reconceptualizing
the Typical Long-Arm Statute to Codify and Refine International Shoe After
its First Sixty Years, 3 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 339, 361 (2007).
34. O.N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp., 206 S.E.2d 437, 439 (Ga.
1974).
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and a Georgia sales corporation.35 In holding there was no
personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated
“there were no negotiations or contracts entered into in
Georgia with respect to the goods that are the subject matter of
these actions.”36 Since the Jonas purchases were made by
telephone and mail, Georgia courts held in subsequent cases
that telephone, mail, and e-mail communications from a
nonresident defendant did not confer personal jurisdiction
under subsection (1).37 This limited reading remained in effect
for some time, and was only expanded in very limited
applications in lawsuits initiated by banks.38 However, in
2005, the Jonas principles, and all the subsequent cases that
relied on it, were overturned in the landmark case, Innovative
Clinical & Consulting Services (“ICCS”). 39
In ICCS a Georgia resident had brought claims for breach
of contract, fraud, and conversion against non-resident First
National Bank of Ames.40 The bank had a security interest in a
lease agreement between Innovative and a financing
corporation, which was also a customer of the bank.41 The
Georgia Court of Appeals relied on precedent specifying the
requirement of a contract and therefore applied subsection (1)
to the breach of contract claim only.42 The court determined
ICCS’s breach of contract claim was not even “remotely related
to the security interest taken by the bank.”43 The Georgia
35. Id. at 438.
36. Id. at 439.
37. Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 33, at 363 (citing Catholic
Stewardship Consultant, Inc. v. Ruotolo Assocs., Inc., 608 S.E.2d 1 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2004); First Nat’l Bank of Ames v. Innovative Clinical &
Consulting Servs., L.L.C. (First Nat’l Bank I), 598 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App.
2004); ETS Payphone, Inc. v. TK Indus., 513 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999); Burt v. Energy Servs. Inv. Corp., 427 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993); Commercial Food Specialties, Inc. v. Quality Food Equip. Co., 338
S.E.2d 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Graphic Mach., Inc. v. H.M.S. Direct Mail
Serv., Inc., 281 S.E.2d 343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)).
38. See Ga. R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Barton, 315 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1984) (expanding the scope of the long arm statute by allowing for
jurisdiction over nonresidents purposefully availing themselves of the
protections of Georgia law by doing some act in the state and considering
whether there was “substantial” effect on the forum from the contact).
39. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank
of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005).
40. First Nat’l Bank I, 598 S.E.2d at 532.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 534.
43. Id.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari “to address preconceived
inconsistencies in . . . precedents defining the scope of
personal jurisdiction that Georgia courts may exercise over
nonresidents pursuant to. . . the Georgia long-arm statute.”44
The Georgia Supreme Court’s opinion stated that, because
an earlier case interpreted subsections (2) and (3) of the longarm statute literally, courts should apply that same
interpretation to subsection (1). Since “[n]othing in subsection
(1) limits its application to contract cases”45 or “requires the
physical presence of the nonresident in Georgia or minimizes
the import of a nonresident’s intangible contacts with the
State,”46 under a literal reading, these limitations do not
apply.47 Because the only limitation remaining was that of the
Constitution, the court held that subsection (1) should
henceforth reach “to the maximum extent permitted by
procedural due process.”48 The court explicitly “overrule[d] all
prior cases that fail[ed] to accord the appropriate breadth to
the construction of the ‘transacting any business’ language” of
subsection (1).49 Finally, the court vacated and remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals to “fully consider whether the trial
court had personal jurisdiction over the [nonresident] bank
under [subsection (1)].”50 Unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeals
subsequently found that the trial court had personal
jurisdiction over the bank.51

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION, MINIMUM CONTACTS, AND
44. Innovative, 620 S.E.2d at 353.
45. Id. at 355.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 356.
51. First Nat’l Bank of Ames v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting
Servs., L.L.C., (First Nat’l Bank II) 634 S.E.2d 88, 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
The court found that “the bank’s ‘postal, telephone, and other intangible
Georgia contacts’ were sufficient under the new broader interpretation of
subsection (1),” Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 33, at 368 (quoting First
Nat’l Bank II, 634 S.E.2d at 89), and that “the exercise of personal
jurisdiction was within the limits of constitutional due process, because
‘the bank’s “business” was not brought to Georgia through a “unilateral
action” of ICCS.’” Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 33, at 368 n.116
(quoting First Nat’l Bank II, 634 S.E.2d at 89, and Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1985)).
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THE INTERNET GENERALLY
Since it has been established, through ICCS, that the
Georgia long-arm statute’s reach shall be to the full extent
allowed by due process, before analyzing how Georgia courts
define due process as it relates to Internet contacts, we should
first look to influential national cases describing how due
process applies to Internet contacts.

A. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INTERNET CONTACTS AND THE
ZIPPO TEST
Early cases regarding Internet jurisdiction can be
described as inconsistent at best. One of the first to address
the issue of personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts
was Inset Systems v. Instruction Set, Inc.52 In that case, the
defendant, a Massachusetts company, was subject to personal
jurisdiction in Connecticut after posting advertisements on its
website and offering a toll-free phone number.53 The court
reasoned that because the defendant’s website was designed to
communicate with people in every state, posting information
on the website was the same as directing advertisements
toward every state.54 Because the defendant’s advertisements
were accessible to all Internet users in Connecticut, it had
“purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business” in
the state.55 The fact that the defendant had no employees or
offices in Connecticut nor conducted any regular business
there was irrelevant to the court.56 Since the court reasoned
that the posting of information on a website was analogous to
television or radio advertisements, it inferred that Internet
users were being repetitively solicited with the information.57
“Fortunately for Internet merchants, later decisions have
taken the Internet’s unique qualities into consideration and
required proof that the defendant’s Internet activities were

52. Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D.
Conn. 1996).
53. Id. at 164.
54. See id. at 165.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 162–63.
57. See id. at 164; Aaron S. Guin, Transactions: Internet Jurisdiction
and Forum Selection Clauses, 2 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 33, 35
(2000) (stating that the Inset court “expanded the understanding of
purposeful availment to its extreme conclusion”).
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purposely directed at the forum state.”58 In Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King,59 a New York federal court held that
to extend jurisdiction over the defendant, a Missouri club
owner, on the basis of the club’s website alone would violate
the Due Process Clause.60 The court reasoned “that posting
information on the Internet is more analogous to placing a
product into the stream of commerce, which may be ‘felt
nationwide’ but without more does not establish minimum
contacts.”61 Because the defendant neither conducted
business in New York nor directed New York residents to his
club’s website, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction.62
Finally, in 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania issued a landmark opinion that set
forth a new method for conducting the minimum contacts
analysis which has been cited in almost every Internet
jurisdiction case since.63 The case, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,64 concerned a dispute between the Zippo
lighter company, a Pennsylvania corporation, and Zippo Dot
Com, a California-based news service that obtained domain
name registration for such sites as “zippo.com,” “zippo.net,”
and “zipponews.com.”65 The District Court found jurisdiction
proper even though the California resident did not have any
physical presence in the forum state.66

58. Quinn K. Nemeyer, Comment, Don’t Hate the Player, Hate the
Game: Applying the Traditional Concepts of General Jurisdiction to Internet
Contacts, 52 LOY. L. REV. 147, 168 (2006).
59. Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(involving trademark infringement claims between the plaintiff, owner of
the “Blue Note” jazz club in New York, and the defendant, owner of the
“Blue Note” jazz club in Missouri).
60. Id. at 300–01.
61. Nemeyer, supra note 58, at 169 (quoting Bensusan Rest. Corp.,
937 F. Supp. at 301); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (“The placement of a product into the
stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”).
62. Bensusan Rest. Corp., 937 F. Supp. at 301.
63. See Nemeyer, supra note 58, at 171 (“[T]he Zippo sliding scale has
been widely adopted as the appropriate approach for evaluating Internetbased forum contacts in the context of specific jurisdiction.”).
64. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D.
Pa. 1997).
65. Id. at 1121.
66. Id. at 1126–27.
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The Zippo court’s analysis concerned “the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the
Internet.”67 The court distinguished between three broad
categories of websites based on their interactive and
commercial characteristics, and created a sliding scale
analysis for distinguishing between the sites.68 At one end of
the scale are websites that conduct business over the Internet
and actively target a forum state through advertising efforts
and information collection.69 At the other end of the scale are
websites that are “passive” and merely include information or
advertisements.70 Finally, the third category of websites, in the
middle of the sliding scale, are interactive websites which allow
a user to exchange information and possibly conduct business
with a host computer.71
An example of a website actively targeting a forum state,
the first end of the Zippo scale, is the defendant’s site in
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson.72 There, the Internet activities
were clearly aimed at the forum.73 In its opinion finding
jurisdiction proper, the Sixth Circuit held the defendant’s
distribution of software via the plaintiff’s servers, along with
the underlying commercial nature of the relationship between
the parties, to satisfy “minimum contacts.”74 An example of a
passive website, at the other end of the Zippo scale, is the
printable mail-in order form available on the defendant’s
webpage in Mink v. AAAA Development, L.L.C.75 Finally, the
case cited in Zippo as an example of an interactive website, in
the middle of the sliding scale, is Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc.76
That case concerned a website that allowed users to add their
address to a mailing list which would send them updates
about a forthcoming advertising service.77

67. Id. at 1124.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
73. See id. at 1266.
74. Id. at 1265-66.
75. Mink v. AAAA Development, L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.
1999) (adopting the Zippo test and concluding the defendant’s website was
passive).
76. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
77. Id. at 1330.
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In holding that the exercise of jurisdiction over Zippo Dot
Com in Pennsylvania was proper, the Zippo opinion stated that
the company’s website fell at the first end of the scale—the
website actively targeted the forum state.78 Even though the
company did not have any physical presence in Pennsylvania,
it advertised its news service to the Internet public with the
help of Internet service providers that had bases of operation
in Pennsylvania.79 The problem with the test, however, is that
in the middle of the scale, when analyzing interactive websites,
Zippo encourages inquiry into the level of interactivity but does
not describe a hard rule for analyzing the interactivity.80 No
clear list of principles or judicial method for analyzing specific
factual circumstances has been put forth to analyze the middle
of the Zippo scale. Unfortunately, this is where questions of
jurisdiction regarding interactive eBay transactions lie, and
subsequent courts have found both for and against
jurisdiction.81

B. CASES AND STATUTES RELATED TO THE INTERNET AND
PERSONAL JURISDICTION THROUGH EBAY SALES
Many courts forced to wrestle with the question of
personal jurisdiction over eBay Internet sellers have held on
both sides of the Zippo scale. In a recent opinion concerning
the Louisiana long-arm statute, which allows for jurisdiction
within the limits of due process,82 a Louisiana appeals court
upheld a trial court’s ruling which concluded that Louisiana
had jurisdiction over a Texas recreational vehicle (“RV”) seller
who advertised the vehicle on eBay.83 Despite the sale actually
being consummated, and the vehicle paid for, in Texas, the
court stated “the use of the eBay website to market and sell
the RV to a Louisiana buyer is, on the Zippo sliding scale, more
78. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126–27.
79. Id. at 1126.
80. See Brian D. Boone, Comment, Bullseye!: Why a “Targeting”
Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in the E-Commerce Context Makes Sense
Internationally, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 241, 257–58 (2006).
81. See discussion infra Part II.B.
82. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201(B) (2006) (“A court of this state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent
with the constitution of this state and of the Constitution of the United
States.”).
83. Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 503–05 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
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akin to those situations for which a finding of personal
jurisdiction is proper.”84 The court continued: “Defendants
used a variety of means of electronic communication to
advertise, puff, negotiate, and accept payment for its product
directed to a Louisiana consumer. Thus, sufficient minimum
contacts, effectuated by electronic communications, have been
established to maintain personal jurisdiction.”85
Dissenting from the majority’s opinion, Judge Welch
stated:
In analyzing the facts of this case, the majority focuses
“particularly” on Zippo’s “sliding scale,” and in doing so, they fail
to consider the most important question in any personal
jurisdiction due process inquiry – that is, whether the defendant
has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within Louisiana, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.86

He went on to say that “the few contacts that the
defendants did have with Louisiana by virtue of this and any
other sale on eBay were the exact type of ‘random, fortuitous,
or attenuated’ contacts that [the U.S. Supreme Court] intended
to exclude from jurisdictional reach.”87
Investigating further into opinions from other states
reveals many jurists who agree with Judge Welch. In Sayeedi
v. Walser88 a resident of New York brought an action for
breach of contract against the defendant, a resident of
Missouri, resulting from the sale of an automobile engine
through eBay which was shipped to New York.89 The court
concluded that, under these facts, “to summon the defendant
into a New York court . . . would contravene the traditional
notions of ‘fair play’ and ‘substantial justice’ that have become
the ‘touchstone of personal jurisdiction.’”90
In a similar case, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
held that the placement of an “Internet advertisement and one
prior sale” to a resident of North Carolina did not constitute
84. Id. at 503.
85. Id. at 504.
86. Id. at 508 (Welch, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion,
Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 504, and citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958)).
87. Id. at 511 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
475 (1985)).
88. Sayeedi v. Walser, 835 N.Y.S.2d 840 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2007).
89. Id. at 841.
90. Id. at 846.
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sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina to comply
with federal due process.91 The defendant’s “only contacts were
the solicitation for bids on eBay, e-mails exchanged between
the parties, and the wire transfer of money to defendant.”92
The court stated further that “[i]n soliciting for bids on eBay,
defendant does not target any particular state.”93
Finally, in Metcalf v. Lawson,94 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire addressed a lower court ruling finding that New
Hampshire had jurisdiction over a New Jersey defendant who
sold an excavator on eBay.95 In holding that the defendant did
not intentionally direct her activities at New Hampshire, the
court concluded that “the defendant did not engage in
sufficient activity in this State to make it fair and reasonable
for purposes of due process to require her to defend [the claim
in New Hampshire].”96 It is also of interest to note that while
analyzing the case under the Zippo test, the court concluded
“[t]he Zippo test is not particularly helpful in this case,
however, because the majority of cases using it are based upon
a defendant’s conduct over its own website. Unlike those
cases, the transaction in this case was conducted through an
Internet auction site.”97
The most appropriate conclusion which can be drawn from
a reading of these cases is that the law in this area is
unsettled. Courts around the country are having difficulty
grasping how to address personal jurisdiction as it relates to ecommerce in general and online auction sales in particular.

III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET IN
GEORGIA AND OTHER STATES
With a general understanding of the Georgia long-arm
statute’s reach and the—albeit unsettled—extent of due
process as it relates to Internet jurisdiction, we are now ready
to look at the Georgia long-arm statute specifically to see how

91. Buckland v. Hobbs, No. COA05-698, 2006 WL 695665, at *2 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2006).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221 (N.H. 2002).
95. Id. at 1224.
96. Id. at 1227.
97. Id. at 1226 (citations omitted).
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Georgia courts analyze eBay sale jurisdiction issues within the
confines of due process.

A. AN EBAY CASE BEFORE ICCS
Since the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction must be
analyzed in terms of the long-arm statute first, and, if
necessary, constitutional due process second, it is useful to
look at Muir v. Assad, 98 a Georgia case which analyzes an
eBay sale dispute prior to the Georgia Supreme Court’s ICCS
opinion. This analysis, as compared to the later Aero decision,
shows how a Georgia court may restrict itself by analyzing
legislative intent99 with regard to long-arm jurisdiction and
prevent legal inequities from pulling an innocent out-of-state
eBay user into Georgia.
Muir is the first Georgia case to directly address the issue
of long-arm jurisdiction over out-of-state online auction sellers.
Muir, just like the Aero case, concerned a Georgia plaintiff who
purchased a vehicle from an out-of-state eBay seller.100 The
plaintiff sued the Washington state seller after the vehicle
arrived in Georgia “allegedly in worse condition than
advertised.”101
In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on
lack of jurisdiction, Superior Court Judge Bessen
acknowledged that other jurisdictions recognize evolving
concepts of personal jurisdiction; however, he stated that “this
Court is . . . constrained to follow existing law.”102 He reviewed
prior Georgia Supreme Court opinions which attempted to
interpret the long-arm statute broadly, but then stated that the
supreme court’s opinion in Gust v. Flint103 led lower courts to
adopt a narrowed interpretation of the statute.104 In the end,
Judge Bessen criticized the limited interpretation of the longarm statute, and stated “our courts’ interpretations of the
98. Muir v. Assad, No. Civ. A. 05VS079202J, 2005 WL 3367697 (Ga.
Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2005).
99. Less than a year after the Muir opinion, the Georgia Supreme
Court ruled in ICCS that the assumed legislative intent in Muir, and the
cases it cites, was incorrect. See Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs.,
L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352, 355 (Ga. 2005).
100. Muir, 2005 WL 3367697, at *1.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *2–*3.
103. Gust v. Flint, 356 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. 1987).
104. Muir, 2005 WL 3367697, at *2.

HOLTE RT. What is Really Fair: Internet Sales and the Georgia Long-Arm Statute. MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 567-590.

582

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 10:2

[long-arm statute] have not met its intended and declared
policy. . . . [O]ur decisions may not provide Georgians who are
damaged by nonresidents a forum in this state to the fullest
extent permitted by . . . the U.S. Constitution.”105
Accordingly, the Muir opinion shows that while the
constitutional limits of due process on the Internet are not
clearly defined, the specific words and intent of a long-arm
statute, as interpreted by courts, will be followed.
Unfortunately, post-ICCS, the intent of the Georgia legislature
has been construed to allow only for constitutional limits to
long-arm jurisdiction, and the Georgia Court of Appeals has
interpreted that to allow jurisdiction over out-of-state eBay
users. The question then becomes whether Judge Bessen was
correct in assuming that Georgians would benefit the most by
allowing a forum to the fullest extent permitted by the U.S.
Constitution.

B. POST ICCS ANALYSIS AND AERO
Since the Georgia Supreme Court’s ICCS opinion
determined that earlier cases, including Muir, conflicted with
the notion that the long-arm statute permits maximum
jurisdiction,106 analyzing jurisdiction over Internet merchants
in Georgia post-ICCS requires only a consideration of whether
a merchant’s contacts with the state permits the exercise of
jurisdiction over the merchant within “the maximum extent
permitted by procedural due process.”107 The first Georgia case
to directly address the issue of long-arm jurisdiction over outof-state online auction sellers after ICCS is Aero Toy Store,
L.L.C. v. Grieves.108
As described earlier,109 the Aero case dealt with a Georgia
resident’s purchase of a vehicle from a Florida auto dealer who
advertised the car on eBay.110 After receiving the vehicle in
Georgia, the buyer filed suit against the seller in Georgia for

105. Id. at *3.
106. See Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l
Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352, 355 (Ga. 2005).
107. See Aero Toy Store, L.L.C. v. Grieves, 631 S.E.2d 734, 739 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2006).
108. Id.
109. See infra Introduction.
110. Aero, 631 S.E.2d at 735.
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making numerous misrepresentations about the car.111 When
Aero motioned to dismiss the suit based on lack of jurisdiction,
the trial court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that
Aero established sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia to
authorize Georgia’s exercise of personal jurisdiction under the
long-arm statute.112
The court began its analysis of jurisdiction based on
Internet communications by stating:
In other jurisdictions, a line of decisions has developed
recognizing the technological revolution ushered in by the
Internet and utilizing a sliding scale for determining whether a
nonresident has submitted to a state’s long arm jurisdiction by
establishing the requisite minimum contacts through Internetbased activity. This sliding scale was initially articulated in Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com.113

After citing Zippo, the Aero court cited two more local
cases regarding minimum contacts and the Internet.114 The
first case was Butler v. Beer Across America,115 where an
Alabama minor ordered twelve beers from sellers in Illinois
through the sellers’ Internet website.116 The second case was
Barton Southern Co. v. Manhole Barrier Systems,117 where a
Georgia manhole security device manufacturing company filed
suit in federal court against a similar New York company for
trademark infringement.118 The Georgia company argued that
the New York company’s website allowed for jurisdiction in
Georgia because it permitted filling out company order forms
and exchanging information with customers.119
While the Aero court admitted both cited cases did not find
for jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, the court
distinguished the Butler and Barton facts from the Aero facts,
because the Aero defendant “operated an interactive website
111. Id.
112. Id. at 736, 741.
113. Id. at 739–40.
114. Id. at 740.
115. Butler v. Beer Across Am., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
116. Aero, 631 S.E.2d at 740 (citing Butler, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1266–67).
117. Barton S. Co. v. Manhole Barrier Sys., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D.
Ga. 2004).
118. Aero, 631 S.E.2d at 740 (citing Barton, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1174).
119. Barton, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1177–78. It is interesting to note that
the district court in this case improperly states that the Georgia long-arm
statute allows for jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by due
process, which was not the case prior to the ICCS decision. See id. at
1176.
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through which it reached out to, and [did] business with,
persons in Georgia.”120 The court specifically pointed out that
“[u]nlike the situation in Butler, the [Aero] car was shipped into
Georgia by the nonresident seller and not by a carrier acting as
the resident buyer’s agent . . . .”121 While the court found that
Aero did “not have officers, employees, offices, or business
affiliates in Georgia, and although the revenue [Aero] derives
from goods sold [in Georgia] may not be substantial,” the court
stated Aero did “regularly solicit business in Georgia through
the Internet” and held that the revenue it derived was “enough
to establish sufficient minimum contacts.”122 Thus, the court
held that with sufficient minimum contacts established,
jurisdiction over Aero would not violate due process and would
be proper.

C. OTHER STATES WITH SIMILAR STATUTES
Despite the Court of Appeals of Georgia holding in Aero
that after ICCS, the Georgia long-arm statute would allow for
jurisdiction over out-of-state eBay users, other state appellate
courts have held differently. For example, in Kolberg v.
Channell123 the State of Massachusetts Appellate Division
Court ruled against jurisdiction over a West Virginia defendant
eBay vehicle seller.124 The Massachusetts statute at issue in
the case reads exactly the same as the Georgia long-arm
statute: “[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person . . . as to a cause of action . . . arising from the person’s
[ ] transacting any business in this commonwealth . . . .”125
While the Massachusetts case law history regarding the statue
does not parallel the interpretations of the statute quite like
the Georgia (pre- and post-ICCS) history, the Kolberg opinion
analyzes the issue of personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state
eBay seller under the statutory language and due process
minimum contacts.126 Both analyses resulted in the court
120. Aero, 631 S.E.2d at 740.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 740–41.
123. Kolberg v. Channell, 2006 Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 8, at **1 (Mass.
App. Div. 2006).
124. Id. at **7.
125. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3(a) (West 2000); Kolberg, 2006
Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 8, at **2.
126. Kolberg, 2006 Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 8, at **4–**7.
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finding the defendant’s contacts with Massachusetts
“insufficient to constitute the transaction of business in
Massachusetts.”127
When analyzing the facts of the case as compared to the
statutory language, the Massachusetts court stated that “the
purposeful and successful solicitation of business from
residents of the Commonwealth will generally satisfy [the
transacting any business] requirement, but an isolated and
minor transaction with a Massachusetts resident is
insufficient.”128 Since “the only connection” between the
plaintiff, Kolberg, and the defendant, Channell, in the case was
“the advertisement on eBay for the sale of the [vehicle],” the
court held that the defendant did not “satisfy the statutory
requirement even with the benefit of a broad construction of its
provisions.”129 In differentiating the facts at issue from cases
the plaintiff cited to support jurisdiction, the court stated:
These cases are readily distinguishable from this case because
Channell did not sell the [vehicle] to Kolberg from his own
personal or business website. Rather, he placed the item for sale
to the highest bidder on eBay. Channell did not maintain eBay’s
website, he only maintained a minimally interactive listing . . . . In
this case, eBay chose the winning bidder.130

With respect to the jurisdictional analysis under the
Constitution’s due process requirements, the Massachusetts
appellate court stated, “Channell’s sale of the [vehicle] on eBay
to Kolberg was random and established only an attenuated
connection to Massachusetts. Channell could not reasonably
anticipate being subject to a lawsuit in Massachusetts based
on this act.”131
Kolberg v. Channell illustrates that courts in different
states with identical long-arm statutory language to interpret
have nevertheless drawn different conclusions on its meanings
as compared to Georgia courts. Additionally, Kolberg shows
again how courts interpreting the issue of constitutional
minimum contacts on the Internet keep arriving at different
conclusions. For these reasons, the Georgia legislature must

127.
128.
(Mass.
(Mass.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at **7.
Id. at **3–**4 (citing Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549
1994) and Sullivan v. Hotown N.V., 1998 Mass. App. Div. 106, 108
Dist. Ct. 1998)).
Id. at **4.
Id. at **5.
Id. at **9.
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specify, in the language of the statute, a clear intent based on
the best policy of encouraging commerce and equity.

IV. DIRECTIONS FOR THE LEGISLATURE
With the problems and inconsistencies associated with the
current Georgia long-arm statute established, we are now
ready to look at a new direction for the statute as it relates to
jurisdiction over online auction sellers and others.

A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING JURISDICTION OVER
ONLINE AUCTION SELLERS
State policymakers traditionally believe citizens should be
able to seek redress within their own state to the greatest
extent possible for claims against nonresidents.132 Providing
an in-state forum for resident businesses mitigates the cost of
litigating suits against out-of-state defendants and improves
the state’s business climate for smaller companies who have a
single location and are more sensitive to litigation expenses.133
Additionally, since the nonresident defendant is often enjoying
the benefits and protections of the state’s laws, it is typically in
the state’s interests to regulate business activities affecting its
citizens within the plaintiff-resident’s state courts.134
With respect to eBay sales in particular, policies favoring
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants allow buyers to feel
comfortable that purchases will not be fraught with fraud or
false advertising. Since the cost would be great for sellers to
defend themselves in foreign legal actions, they would be more
inclined to advertise truthfully and settle matters before
litigation with foreign buyers ensues.135 Thus, the legislature’s
goal is to have its state codes, and courts, regulate business
activities affecting its citizens and scare, with litigation
expense, out-of-state sellers into truthful advertising and
pretrial settlement.

132.
133.
134.
135.

Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 33, at 345.
See id. at 347.
See Rhodes, supra note 20, at 163.
See Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 504 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
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B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DISCOURAGING JURISDICTION OVER
ONLINE AUCTION SELLERS
Policy reasons against maximum jurisdiction generally
center on ensuring personal jurisdiction that is predictable
and consistent.136 Long-arm laws that allow for jurisdiction to
the maximum extent permissible under the Constitution force
state courts and practitioners to be at the mercy of federal
courts to define what is acceptable. Since the interpretation of
federal law varies from district to district and circuit to circuit,
a clearly defined statute for long-arm jurisdiction that is
undoubtedly within the confines of due process is required in
order to bring about a predictable and consistent
application.137 Additionally, a policy that does not allow
residents to overextend the reach of state courts allows out-ofstate businesses to feel more comfortable conducting business
with a certain state’s residents.138
With respect to eBay sales specifically, the mere existence
of an e-commerce rule which allows buyers to subject any
seller to personal jurisdiction would clearly inhibit
transactions—more so than any buyer wary of being forced to
litigate in the home court of out-of-state sellers.139
Furthermore, the variances in jurisdictional reach would make
it practical for online sellers to preclude certain buyers from
participating in online auctions due to their state’s rules
despite a buyer making an individual informed decision of
transacting with a specific seller. The effect could be a do-notsell list where sellers assess the risk of selling to certain buyers
to be far greater than the benefit. In contrast, if a buyer were
wary of a foreign seller, the buyer could simply conduct more
research into the seller and its products, or the buyer could
choose to purchase from a local seller.

C. WHAT IS REALLY FAIR?
Most commentators agree that the “fairness factors”
should be the deciding issue when qualitative and quantitative
contacts analyses result in no clear jurisdictional

136. See Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 33, at 348
137. Id.
138. See George M. Perry et al., Where Can You Be Sued, and Whose
Laws Apply?, 7 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (1998).
139. See Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 511 (Welch, J., dissenting).
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conclusions.140 Traditional notions of fair play is also the
second step in the International Shoe minimum contacts test.
Since requisite contacts may or may not be established in ecommerce jurisdiction cases, and the policies for both allowing
and not allowing jurisdiction over out-of-state eBay users
stack rather evenly, the final legislative decision regarding
eBay transactions should rest upon an evaluation of
equity/fairness.
Haling an out-of-state eBay defendant-seller into a foreign
jurisdiction to litigate a dispute regarding the sale results in
three fundamental fairness issues. First, in order to complete
the sale to a plaintiff-buyer, it is the plaintiff-buyer who must
proactively access the eBay website, browse through the many
listings, and then systematically pick and bid on a specific
item from a specific seller. In contrast, the seller merely posts
the advertisement onto the third party eBay website and waits
for eBay to choose a winning bidder as the Massachusetts
appellate court in Kolberg noted. Second, an eBay sellerdefendant does not target any specific buyer. While an eBay
product listing may be tailored to a certain buyer’s needs, it
cannot be targeted to a particular state. In contrast, a buyer
can search for products in a certain geographical area and
thereby ensure a home state forum should a dispute arise.
Finally, an eBay seller-defendant may not have her own store,
business, or even website. Posting a product for sale on eBay
is much simpler than hosting an interactive webpage with
online ordering tools, contact phone numbers, and capabilities
to process payments. The eBay website works by creating a
huge marketplace that people come to for one-stop shopping
and functions that allow buyers and sellers to reduce risk by
essentially not dealing with each other directly.141
Due to these fundamental fairness issues—which all weigh
against allowing jurisdiction over out-of-state eBay users—and

140. See Nemeyer, supra note 58, at 183 (citing Charles W. “Rocky”
Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 887
(2004)).
141. For example, eBay’s PayPal site allows buyers to pay eBay with a
standard credit card or bank account. After eBay receives the funds,
sellers receive the money directly from eBay. See PayPal, About Us,
https://www.paypal-media.com/aboutus.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
Thus sellers do not have to deal with a potentially fraudulent buyer, and
buyers do not have to give their personal information directly to a seller.
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the other ambiguities regarding the Georgia long-arm statute,
it is necessary for the Georgia State Legislature to revisit the
statutory language and clarify the intent of the current longarm statute. The Legislature should ensure that courts have
clear guidelines to follow when determining whether they have
jurisdiction over out-of-state residents. Furthermore, the
Legislature should specifically write into the statute or
legislative history that jurisdiction should not be granted over
out-of-state residents who have merely used a third party
auction website to conduct a transaction over the Internet. In
this way the Georgia long-arm statute application would return
back to the more refined days of Muir, and the Georgia
Legislature, as opposed to the Georgia courts, would be the
ultimate policy maker in business litigation jurisdiction issues.

CONCLUSION
Few eBay sellers understand that through a simple eBay
sale, they could be haled into court on the opposite side of the
country litigating with a buyer over the transaction under the
buyer’s state’s rules. With the popularity of e-commerce sites
growing, and the jurisdiction of state long-arm statues
increasing, this issue is only going to become more important.
Georgia, and any other state, could be placed on a “do or donot- sell list” for eBay and other online sellers to target buyers
who have a lower risk of subjecting the seller to legal liability.
In order to prevent this problem, and to address the issue
of overreaching jurisdiction, Georgia, and other state
legislatures, should revisit their respective long-arm statutes.
Amended statutes should ensure that courts have clear
guidelines to follow when determining whether they have
jurisdiction over out-of-state residents. Further, an amended
statute should make explicit that jurisdiction will not be
permitted over out-of-state residents who have merely used a
third party website to conduct a transaction over the Internet.

